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In 1963, violent clashes following proposals for constitutional changes favouring the Greek Cypriots left hundreds killed, wounded and kidnapped. Thousands of Turkish Cypriots became displaced and relocated into enclaves where they lived under economic and military stress. Their leadership began to administer the community鈥檚 affairs themselves. Pressured by the Guarantee States, the United Nations Security Council mandated UNFICYP to prevent further violence. 

However, in 1974, the Greek junta attempted a coup against the Greek Cypriot President, inducing an escalation of armed violence on the island. Turkey resumed its Guarantee power to intervene and occupied one-third of the island [3] [4]. In the events, hundreds of thousands Greek Cypriots became displaced, and thousands of people were killed or went missing. After the ceasefire, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were pressured to move and create ethnically homogenous zones. Proceeding, Turkish Cypriots self-proclaimed their breakaway Republic only recognised by Turkey, while UNFICYP created a buffer zone along the demarcation line. While often referred to as an 'ethnic conflict', it was not ethnically driven, but a conflict on power and resource-sharing exercised along ethnic lines. 

The EU accession of Cyprus in 2004 meant to incite a peace settlement but further complicated the issue: it was accompanied by the UN-brokered 鈥楢nnan Plan鈥� that proposed the bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal 鈥楿nited Cyprus Republic鈥�. In simultaneous twin-referenda, this peace deal was rejected by the Greek Cypriots, while accepted by the Turkish Cypriots. Notwithstanding, de jure, the entire island accessed the EU, while de facto, only the South did. Turkish Cypriots received EU passports but felt betrayed. They remain marginalised in a surreal scenario of existing in a non-place. 

Besides the buffer zone physically manifesting the conflict and ethnic separation, fundamental grievances continue and consolidate the communities鈥� locked position as adversaries (B膬dulescu 2017). The pivotal role of 鈥渟ocietal beliefs, opinions and concerns [鈥�], fears, pain and mistrust鈥� (Hadjipavlou 2007, p. 363) remain often overlooked in analysis and negotiations but pose significant obstacles to peacebuilding. 

Greek Cypriots aim to use both the vote on the Annan Plan and the EU membership as leverage against the Turkish 鈥榦ccupation and threat鈥� in future negotiations (Casaglia 2019) [5]. This reveals their understanding of the conflict. The trauma of the 1974 Turkish 鈥渙ccupation, invasion and aggression鈥� (B膬dulescu 2017, p. 36) constitutes the reference point in their collective identity. From their perspective, Turkey is solely responsible for the conflict, the primal threat in the present and the stumbling block for peace in the future. They blame Turkish Cypriots for not emancipating from Turkey which allegedly substantially finances and 鈥榗ontrols鈥� Northern Cyprus (Bryant & Yakinthou 2012). 

In contrast, Turkish Cypriots perceive Greek Cypriots as unwilling to share power and resources. They feel marginalised by both the Greek Cypriots鈥� side-lining and Turkish paternalism (Bryant & Yakinthou 2012). Their collective point of reference and trauma is the accumulated suffering of 鈥溾�榠nhumane practices鈥�, 鈥榰nbearable conditions鈥� and the 鈥榲eritable siege鈥� that took place between 1963 and 1974鈥� (2017, p. 41). Thus, Greek Cypriots are considered primarily responsible for the conflict and its solution. 

This dynamic of appointing responsibility to external (f)actors (Hadjipavlou 2007) prevents dialogue and trust-building between the communities and collective ownership over the peace process. Any political development like the gas dispute is understood through these discursive and cognitive patterns. In the gas dispute, Turkish Cypriots feel confirmed in their marginalised position, while Greek Cypriots use the leverage of EU membership to position themselves against the perceived Turkish threat. Consequently, the gas dispute consolidates fears, mistrust and ethnic divide. 

The Hydrocarbon-isationof the Cyprus Conflict [6]

The gas dispute is as much characterised by questions on territory, sovereignty and power as the Cyprus Conflict and the Greek-Turkish Aegean dispute [7]. With growing interest in hydrocarbon exploitation, the Republic of Cyprus concluded agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel to delineate its Continental Shelf and to declare and delimit its exclusive economic zone at least in the south of the island in accordance with the International Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)[8] [9] [10]. Because Turkey, has neither signed the convention nor considers it binding and has, alongside Northern Cyprus, questioned the Republic's sovereignty and rejected the EEZ agreements. Furthermore, Northern Cyprus criticises that the Republic refuses to involve it in the exploitation of the island鈥檚 gas and distribution of the resulting wealth. It should be noted that the gas reserves are assumed to be too small to position any state as a global energy playern [11] . 

Isolating the dispute as a hydrocarbon driven conflict between Turkey and Greece ignores its Cypriot dimension and its 鈥渟ignificant conflict potential鈥� (Faustmann) [12]. In this frozen conflict context, hydrocarbon exploration is utilised for reasons of power rather than energy (Efthymiou 2019). Gas becomes a political tool and leverage to shift the balance and dynamics of power and re-position oneself as the player with the upper hand in future (peace) negotiations (Kahveci 脰zg眉r 2017). Therefore, on the one hand, gas-related tensions provide urgency and yet another reason to bring parties to the table which incited both the promising peace talks in 2014 and the informal UN 鈥�5+1鈥� Cyprus Talks in April 2021. At the same time, gas has substantially spoilt peace talks and consolidated and legitimised 鈥渉istorical mistrust and maximalist negotiation positions鈥� (Oosterholt 2019, p. 72) [13]. 

Consequently, gas is significant for the re-continuation of talks but not decisive, because it has neither been the cause of conflict nor will it be the catalyst for peace. Those arguing that commercial incentives from a cooperative hydrocarbon exploration sufficed to initiate or even sustain a Cyprus settlement and Turkish-Greek rapprochement remain on a one-dimensional and de-contextualised level of analysis. This cost-benefit-ratio-lens obscures the hyper-complex conflict situation, disregards psycho-social factors and, frankly, displays wishful thinking. Gas became 鈥減art and parcel of other unresolved aspects鈥� (Tziarras) rather than promising future peace through cooperation[14]. 

Firstly, de-contextualising the gas dispute form the Cyprus Conflict obscures that they are characterised by the same causes and dynamics (Oosterholt 2019). In a way, the border where the Cyprus Conflict manifests shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean (Efthymiou 2019). Thus, gas became a proxy for the Cyprus Conflict. The gas dispute became a projection surface/screen where every-present conflict issues, narratives of victimhood, threat, mistrust, insufficient power-sharing and territory are re-produced and perpetuated, consequently hardening and legitimising pre-existing lines of conflict. 

Secondly, de-contextualising the gas dispute from the Cyprus Conflict obscures its consequences on the latter. While the international community tried to cool down the Aegean dispute, only a few wondered whether the frozen Cyprus conflict warmed up (again). Not only was the energy issue superimposed on the pre-existing conflict, but it further consolidated, deepened and complicated it (Tzimitras) [15]. 

Consequently, languished in obscurity from the international community, the Cyprus Conflict and its peace process became hydrocarbon-ised. While the frozen status quo was shortly but significantly de-stabilised, the Cyprus Conflict, however, remains 鈥渓argely frozen鈥� (Tziarras). 

Conclusion 

According to the currently dominant discursive and cognitive patterns informed by victimhood, mistrust and trauma, both Cypriot communities blame and hold the respective 'Other' responsible. Consequently, gas could not escape Cypriot conflict politics and culture and was re-interpreted within this conflict context (Efthymiou 2019). 

The international community failed to address the gas dispute as the crop that grew on the conflict-ridden soil of the Cyprus conflict. The snapshot focus on an isolated Greek-Turkish gas dispute reveals that the international community鈥檚 hegemonic international security paradigm selects whose conflicts are worth remembering. In contrast to the gas dispute, the Cyprus Conflict does not attract sufficient interest from the international community. Considering the Turkish soldiers on de jure EU land and Cyprus's strategic geographical position, this is surprising. 

As this analysis has shown, the Cyprus Conflict's dynamics and dimensions must be considered and the gas dispute must be contextualised to comprehend and adequately respond to it. Otherwise, the political stalemate of non-recognition and de-legitimisation between Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus (and Greece), and Northern Cyprus is cemented. Despite fierce civic engagement like in the Unite Cyprus Now campaign, the 2011/2014-2017 peace talks鈥� failure due to irreconcilable core issues and this year鈥檚 Geneva talks crashing on even harder conflict lines dash hopes for a re-unified Cyprus in near future[16]. And so, political elites continue to bargain for power instead of negotiating peace. In this zero-sum game, each player is striving to gain the upper hand, believing that gas can be the trump card for victory.