By Thomas Keil
After the Colombian people's surprising "no" to the peace agreement with the FARC in October, the Colombian government has now succeeded in negotiating and adopting a new peace treaty. After 52 years of armed conflict, peace finally seems within reach. However, the adoption of the peace treaty by no means marks the end of the Colombian peace process. On the contrary, its implementation and the transformation of the causes of the conflict pose major challenges for Colombian society. It is important that the international community does not now turn its attention away from Colombia.
The almost never-ending story: agreement and adoption of the peace agreement
For all supporters of the peace agreement in Colombia, December 13 brought good news: the Constitutional Court ruled that the adoption of the revised agreement between the government and the FARC guerrillas by Congress is valid. No less important is the fact that the so-called "fast-track" mechanism, which allows bills and constitutional amendments to implement the peace treaty to be fast-tracked through parliament, was also left intact. This means that the necessary conditions are now in place to quickly provide the most urgent components for the initial implementation of the agreements - above all the amnesty law and the special justice system for peace. These are particularly important in order to create security of expectation on the part of the FARC, who are to gather and disarm over the next six months.
The protracted chapter of negotiating and adopting a peace agreement in the thriller known as the "Colombian peace process" has finally come to an end. A success that should not be underestimated if you recall the events of recent months: after the ceremonial signing of the agreement in Cartagena on September 26, the Colombians rejected the historic treaty less than a week later by a wafer-thin majority in a referendum. The result of around four years of negotiations was thus delegitimized for the time being. A brief period of shock was followed by large demonstrations for peace, mainly initiated by students, and the announcement from Norway that President Santos was to receive this year's Nobel Peace Prize. The sequence of events was so rapid and confusing that comparisons with were made in abundance.
As a result, the negotiating teams and the Santos government, in dialog with the various voices of the "NO" campaign in particular, endeavoured to collect proposals and incorporate them into the renegotiations. On November 12, a new agreement was presented, which follows the structure and content of the first one, but nevertheless contains some important clarifications and changes): For example, the new agreement will no longer have constitutional status, the restrictions on freedom in the context of special justice sentences have been significantly clarified and offenses committed by FARC members in connection with drug trafficking will now no longer receive blanket amnesties. On the other hand, there were hardly any changes to the issue of political participation: ex-guerrillas are not to lose their political rights under the special justice system and the FARC successor party is still guaranteed five seats per parliamentary chamber for two terms. However, the hope of achieving a broad national consensus through the renegotiations was not fulfilled. The prominent heads of the "No" party did not change their minds and so political polarization remains high even with the revised agreement.
The new chapter: Challenges and dangers of implementation
So what are the prospects for the next part of the Colombian peace story, the implementation of the agreement? In his on receiving the Nobel Prize, President Juan Manuel Santos said that the whole of America is now a zone of peace. However, this claim is somewhat premature: in order for peace to actually be achieved in Colombia, it is essential how well the peace agreements and the reforms contained therein can be implemented. This view is also by peace and conflict research. Several factors pose a risk in this context.
Firstly, it is well known that this is an agreement between the government and the FARC. It offers the prospect of transforming the country's most important guerrilla organization by far into a legal political actor. However, the planned formal negotiations with the smaller "National Liberation Army" (ELN) are still pending. There are also other illegal armed actors, including the remnants of previously partially demobilized guerrillas, successors to the paramilitaries and gangs. Smaller splinter groups have also formed within the FARC that do not want to demobilize. The aforementioned actors continue to cause insecurity in the mostly marginalized areas of the country they occupy or are engaged in an incipient violent competition for the "succession" of sovereignty over illegal economies in territories previously controlled by the FARC. This existence of armed "spoilers" is a serious obstacle to the implementation phase and thus to the establishment of lasting peace. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in the country about this problem and about the 52 politically motivated murders that have already taken place in 2016.
A second problem is Colombia's economic prospects. Exports (of raw materials) are weakening and the country's growth between May and August this year was just two percent, the worst figure in seven years. State institutions are struggling with declining budgets and it is questionable to what extent the planned tax reform can boost state revenues. The revised version of the peace treaty also emphasizes that implementation should not call fiscal sustainability into question. While research cites evidence of the for the "durability" of peace agreements, the prospects in this regard are currently quite bleak.
A third factor is the aforementioned strong political polarization in the country. It is unlikely that this will subside, especially as the next presidential elections are due in spring 2018. This is likely to lead to increased unrest within the heterogeneous governing coalition in 2017. Meanwhile, there is an intense debate in parts of the left-wing opposition as to whether to go into the pre-election period with the prospect of the broadest possible coalition for peace or whether they would prefer to take a hard line against the incumbent center-right government. With a view to the sustainability of the peace process, the former option appears to be the best option, especially as the right-wing and ultra-conservative forces proved their great ability to mobilize in the referendum. Even with a broad alliance of supporters of the peace agreement, there is a risk that the next president will hardly support or even reject the peace process - with serious consequences for its implementation. A heavy burden in this context is the rejection of the first peace agreement at the ballot box and the adoption of the revised agreement by Congress. This provides an excellent target for opponents of the process, who can easily question the legitimacy of the agreement.
Conclusion
The agreement on a new agreement with the FARC and its adoption offer the opportunity to come much closer to the goal of sustainable peace in Colombia. This requires the consistent implementation of the (re)integration of the FARC as a whole into political life on the one hand and the socio-economic reintegration of its members on the other. It requires effective protection for the demobilized but also for activists and human rights defenders. In order to achieve lasting peace, there is also a need for improved participation in the political process, effective transitional justice and reparations for the victims of the violent conflict. Finally, extensive economic reforms are needed, which the peace agreement provides for, particularly with regard to rural economies. It is now up to Colombian politics and civil society to actively demand and support the implementation of the peace agreement. Broad and effective alliances for the peace process are of great importance for this. In the meantime, the international community should demonstrate its support for peace and the alliances that support it at least as strongly as it has done so far. Under these conditions, the seemingly never-ending story of the Colombian peace process can be written to a successful conclusion.
