The OSCE 40 years after Helsinki: Dialogue instead of confrontation - even in times of crisis?
by Ursel Schlichting
In view of the return of war to Europe, the founding ideas of the OSCE are once again highly topical today. After a long phase of loss of importance, the need for a multilateral forum for dialog on European security that includes Russia as an equal partner has become apparent in times of the Ukraine crisis.
The beginnings of the OSCE (1975-1990)
The signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on August 1, 1975 was the culmination of two years of negotiations that had begun in Helsinki in July 1973. The fact that we are celebrating the 40th anniversary of this event this year is an indication that the idea of cooperative security and permanent multilateral dialog on security in Europe has lost none of its relevance 25 years after the end of the Cold War. The successor to the CSCE, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), today comprises 57 states from Europe, North America and Asia, including all the successor states to the Soviet Union. In the following, I would like to take a look back at the beginnings of the CSCE/OSCE, its role in Europe after the end of the Cold War and its unexpected rise to prominence in the Ukraine crisis.
In the phase from 1973/1975 until the end of the Cold War, in which threatening situations arose more than once in which a "hot" war between the highly armed blocs using nuclear weapons seemed possible, the distinctive features of the CSCE/OSCE developed that are still unmistakable today: the multilateral dialog on security in Europe that transcends political and ideological boundaries and bloc mentalities and the comprehensive understanding of security. According to this, security can only be guaranteed if human rights are understood as an integral part of security and if politico-military, economic and environmental issues are treated equally. The Helsinki Final Act forms the basis of the security dialog and cooperation in all three areas of security. It comprised three subject areas known at the time as "baskets": 1. security in Europe, 2. cooperation in the economic, scientific, technological and environmental fields and 3. cooperation in the humanitarian field.[1] In addition to a document on confidence-building measures, the "security basket" contained a catalog of ten principles ("decalogue") which was intended to regulate relations between the participating states. These included the sovereign equality of the participating states, the renunciation of the threat or use of force, the inviolability of borders, the territorial integrity of states and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. The Helsinki Final Act is regarded as the "founding document" of the CSCE/OSCE, albeit not in the sense of international law, and the Decalogue is still the central "code of conduct" for its participating states today.
However, the Helsinki Final Act was not only the basis for the dialog between the governments in East and West. It was also perceived by the populations and in the following years became a reference document for oppositionists and dissidents in Eastern Europe, who demanded what their heads of state and government had signed in Helsinki: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, the seventh principle of the Helsinki Decalogue.
The end of the Cold War: the vision of a peaceful Europe and the institutionalization of the CSCE (1990-1994)
It was a CSCE document that sealed the end of the Cold War: In the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of November 21, 1990, the heads of state and government from East and West declared the "age of confrontation and division of Europe" to be over. A "new era of democracy, peace and unity" was now dawning, in which the rule of law and respect for human rights would be guaranteed.
For many, this vision of a peaceful Europe also included renouncing military alliances. The Warsaw Treaty had been dissolved in 1991 - what was the point of NATO now? One proposal for an alternative security architecture envisaged developing the CSCE into a pan-European security organization - based on a security treaty and equipped with a Security Council and its own armed forces, possibly even by transforming NATO into its military arm. Ultimately, however, these ideas proved to be unrealistic. Not only was the West naturally not prepared to dissolve NATO or subordinate it to an organization in which Russia had an equal say. It also did not fit in with the persistent thinking in the categories of "winners" and "losers" of the Cold War, despite all the solemn declarations.
In other respects, too, the euphoria quickly gave way to disillusionment: new internal conflicts, mostly inter-ethnic or "nationality conflicts", which often led to secessionist conflicts, escalated into devastating wars in the former Soviet Union and in the disintegrating multi-ethnic state of Yugoslavia and made it abundantly clear that a peaceful Europe was still a long way off.
During this period, a comprehensive, step-by-step institutionalization of the CSCE was initiated. Almost all the organs and institutions of today's OSCE can be traced back to decisions taken in the years 1990-1994. At the same time, the development of a comprehensive set of instruments for preventive diplomacy began and the first long-term missions to normalize the situation after conflicts were sent out, which were to become a trademark of the OSCE over the years. At the Budapest Summit in December 1994, the CSCE was finally renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
From norm-setting to implementation: the expansion of the range of tasks and the road to crisis (from 1995)
The focus of this phase was on resolving the "frozen" conflicts in the post-Soviet region, post-conflict rehabilitation and peace-building, especially in the former Yugoslavia, and the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, mainly in the transition countries. The beginning of this phase is also the heyday of the OSCE's long-term missions and field operations, from the OSCE mission in Tajikistan to the missions in Estonia and Latvia, which ended in 2001 and helped to defuse the conflicts with the Russian minorities there, to the large OSCE missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Two other OSCE institutions also proved to be a success during this period: the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which carried out extensive election monitoring, and the High Commissioner on National Minorities, who contributed to mediation in numerous conflicts affecting national minorities through his impartial and confidential silent diplomacy.
Since the mid-1990s, the interest of the Central Eastern European states in the OSCE has waned considerably. For them, the European Union proved more attractive for economic reasons and NATO for reasons of military security. NATO's gradual eastward enlargement began in 1999, followed by EU enlargement in 2004. Some CIS states, such as Ukraine and Georgia, were caught between the fronts at an early stage.
Since the end of the 1990s, the OSCE has attempted to compensate for the loss of importance threatened by NATO and EU enlargement with new tasks and fields of activity. The Charter for European Security adopted at the Istanbul Summit in 1999 and the OSCE Strategy against Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century agreed at the Maastricht Ministerial Council in 2003 identify numerous new security risks in addition to the continuing threat of interstate and intrastate conflicts: international terrorism and violent extremism, organized crime (arms, drug and human trafficking), economic problems and environmental damage as well as discrimination and intolerance. Counter-terrorism, police work, border security and protection in connection with the fight against transnational threats and organized crime, as well as the fight against discrimination and intolerance are subsequently developing into important new areas of activity. Southeast Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia emerged as regional priorities.
In contrast, the political significance of the OSCE as a European security organization declined during the same period.
The renewed political confrontation between "East" and "West" was soon reflected within the OSCE. Russia and other CIS states criticized the geographically unbalanced distribution of OSCE field operations, its interference in the internal affairs of host states and the ODIHR's election monitoring. Security policy issues were also increasingly neglected in favor of an excessive focus on democracy and human rights issues to the detriment of the participating states "east of Vienna". However, disputes not directly related to the OSCE, such as the NATO operation against Serbia in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 or the deployment of a missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic - in short, the disregard for Russian interests and positions in the international context - also had a negative impact on the atmosphere within the organization. The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 ultimately became the - internationally underestimated - harbinger of the Ukraine crisis.
The OSCE's new focus of activity also entailed the risk of fragmentation, unnecessary overlapping work and energy-sapping competition with other international organizations, particularly the EU. Observers soon began to speak of a deep crisis in the OSCE, of a "niche existence" and of an ultimately inevitable political decline.
The Ukraine crisis as a test: a flash in the pan or a new opportunity?
Under the impact of the Russian-Georgian war, the OSCE had begun to refocus on its comparative advantages and core competencies since the end of 2008: the concept of comprehensive and cooperative security, open, permanent, multilateral dialogue and its competencies in the areas of conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and stabilization in the post-conflict period. A first tangible result was a decision on strengthening the OSCE's capabilities in the areas of early warning and early action, among others, in December 2011. On this basis, the OSCE's crisis response procedures were further developed in the following months. Two innovations in particular ultimately paid off in the Ukraine crisis, which escalated in 2014: an internal OSCE list of people who can be selected as so-called "first responders" from the ranks of OSCE staff already working in the Secretariat or in field operations to be deployed to crisis areas as quickly as possible, and the development of a virtual equipment pool that provides important equipment in good time if required. Both enabled the immediate establishment and rapid deployment of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, whose first team was launched on March 21, 2014, just minutes after the decision to deploy was adopted by consensus of all 57 participating States in the Permanent Council. The deployment of the SMM is undoubtedly a highlight of the OSCE's crisis response.[2] Shortly afterwards, OSCE observers were also deployed to two Russian border checkpoints.
The Ukraine crisis has led to an unexpected revaluation of the OSCE. Despite the increasing tensions between Russia and the West, the organization continues to be accepted and used as a forum for security dialogue. The increase in importance is certainly also due to the swift reaction of the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship to the crisis, which made use of the OSCE's conflict management instruments at an early stage, including sending special representatives as representatives of the Chairmanship to various negotiation formats. The Trilateral Contact Group consisting of representatives from Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE is particularly worthy of mention here. On 5 September 2014, the Contact Group agreed on a twelve-point protocol in Minsk, which was also signed by representatives of the separatists and included a ceasefire, the implementation of which was specified in a memorandum on 19 September and is to be monitored by the OSCE. The Minsk Agreement of February 12, 2015 also entrusted the OSCE with the task of monitoring the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the agreed security zone. Even though the agreements have so far proven to be just as fragile as the ceasefire, they do give hope for an easing of the situation.
Conclusion
The CSCE made history with the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and the Charter of Paris in 1990. Its successor, the OSCE, has rendered outstanding services to the implementation of the standards set there. After a period of reorganization and reorientation with regard to its tasks, competences and main areas of activity, a period of uncertainty about its future relevance and the search for a place in the network of European organizations, the OSCE's involvement in the Ukraine crisis now seems to be providing cautiously positive answers. The OSCE's strength still lies in maintaining the dialog on security in Europe across political and ideological dividing lines and in crisis and conflict situations. It is still the only forum for multilateral security dialog in Europe in which Russia is formally involved on an equal footing. Also, unlike the EU, the OSCE is not considered to have any self-interest in the Ukraine conflict. With the introduction of new instruments and the strengthening of tried and tested ones, it has a good chance of successfully carrying out the tasks of conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation in the future and helping to prevent a renewed division of Europe.
By agreeing to the deployment of the special observer mission and the stationing of the observers at the Russian border checkpoints, Russia has signaled that it does not want to burn all bridges and that its interest in cooperation and in maintaining the security policy dialogue has not been completely extinguished. The consensus principle, often criticized as a "brake" on the decision-making process in the OSCE, has proven to be positive in the Ukraine crisis: The consent of all participating states to the activities of the organization not only increases the legitimacy of the OSCE in general. In this case, the consensus principle has also ensured that the OSCE is accepted by Russia as an observer and mediator, as it cannot override Russia's interests with a majority decision.
"If the Organization is now back in the foreground in the case of the conflict in Ukraine, it is certainly also because it has remained the East-West forum parexcellence and the other organizations, despite their expansion to the East, have remained 'Western' organizations from Moscow's perspective [...] The events there have above all recalled the absolute necessity of the ten principles of the Final Act and [the necessity] of the Charter of Paris, which have taken on unexpected relevance as guidelines for solving the problems. [...] The Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, together with all the documents adopted since then, are more important today than ever."[3]
SOURCES
[1] The three "baskets" correspond to the current "dimensions" of the OSCE: the politico-military dimension, the economic and environmental dimension and the human dimension.
[2] A fascinating report on the creation of the SMM is the article by Claus Neukirch, The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Operational Challenges and New Horizons, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014, Baden-Baden 2015, pp. 183-197.
[3] Marianne von Gr眉nigen/Hans-J枚rg Renk, 40 Years of the Helsinki Final Act - A Reason to Celebrate?, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014, Baden-Baden (in progress).
