By Sascha Werthes
Nothing is eaten as hot as it is cooked! But will we like the food served?
It is now certain that Donald J. Trump has been elected as the 45th President of the USA and people all over the world are wondering what this will mean for US foreign and security policy. It is certainly too early to make any serious statements about future foreign and security policy, but the outcome of the elections does not give any hope for ambitious peace policy expectations. In terms of peace policy, the meal seems to be oversalted for the time being.
The impression of Trump conveyed by the media coverage is that of an unconventional presidential candidate. Pithy chauvinistic slogans, mixed with a confrontational "hit it" rhetoric and a flaunted hair-pulling mentality ("Make America Great Again!"), were his trademark during the election campaign. In the spirit of a Machiavellian opportunist, he obviously recognized the signs of the times. A large section of US society - and perhaps not only this section - wants to distance itself from a seemingly saturated political elite, and apparently at all costs. Whether a populist president, as Donald J. Trump is likely to be, will ultimately be able to satisfy this need for political change and the many expectations and hopes remains to be seen. In terms of both domestic and foreign policy, he may ultimately have to display more diplomatic pragmatism than one might expect at the moment.
How much change, how much continuity in US foreign and security policy should we expect?
"Peace through strength" is the foreign and security policy credo with which Donald Trump describes his foreign policy vision. This primarily refers to the most dominant military strength possible for the USA to assert its interests, which will probably also be reflected in an increasing defense budget. A Republican majority in Congress at least opens up the possibility of this. However, Trump's vision of a militarily strong USA does not go hand in hand with an idea of the USA as an enlightened leading power or even a "peace-politically committed world policeman" - however desirable such a role may ultimately be. Rather, military strength should certainly be understood as a repressive means for the purpose of an interest-driven security policy. A continuation of the practice of targeted killings with combat drones, which violates international law, as part of the military strategy in the global fight against transnational terrorism is to be expected here. Trump will also rely on an explicit military strategy in dealing with the so-called Islamic State and other (Islamist) terrorist organizations. The description of his strategy to combat ISIS states: "My Administration will aggressively pursue joint and coalition military operations to crush and destroy ISIS, (...). Military, cyber and financial warfare will be essential in dismantling Islamic terrorism." As a partner in the prioritized goal of stopping the spread of radical Islam, Trump is ultimately happy with anyone as a possible ally, as long as there is agreement on the goals. Dictators, autocrats and authoritarian regimes are also welcome and suitable allies, regardless of their own rule of law and human rights performance: "All actions should be oriented around this goal, and any country which shares this goal will be our ally. We cannot always choose our friends, but we can never fail to recognize our enemies".
These and many other remarks in his election campaign speeches have already unsettled European allies and cast a first shadow over German-American and intra-European relations. Trump's election victory has already revived the well-known ideas of a "European army." If this were to happen, it would unfortunately also jeopardize constructive accents in a common European foreign and security policy, which in many cases is more concerned with influencing conflict dynamics with non-military means. We would then probably no longer need to count on larger and necessary additional funds for initiatives and the development of structures for early warning and crisis prevention or even for civil conflict management measures. On the other hand, if Trump's view that "enhanced interrogation methods" such as waterboarding are legitimate means for a constitutional state to deal with suspected terrorists were to become more common practice again, then the tensions over a security policy in which the end justifies any means would hopefully become more apparent again in the end. Whether a German-American friendship could then still refer to a living community of values would then have to be questioned at the latest. Unfortunately, there will probably not be any collective distancing from Trump within Europe either. Populist-nationalist forces within the EU will see themselves strengthened by Trump's election victory and align themselves with the new leader in the White House. Trump could even become a further centrifugal impulse with explosive force for the European integration project.
But what about the prospect of Trump reducing the US military presence abroad? At least for Rhineland-Palatinate, this is unlikely to happen for the time being. To the extent that - sadly - a continuation or even expansion of the practice of targeted killings with combat drones as part of the military strategy in the global fight against transnational terrorism is more likely, the drone flight control center in Ramstein is likely to remain of great importance. Ramstein Airbase is one of the most important US military bases outside America and it can be assumed that this will probably remain the case with a hardliner like Trump. "Peace through strength" will ultimately also mean maintaining military bases for the projection of military power. The new military hospital planned and under construction in Weilerbach also suggests that a major reduction in the troop presence in Rhineland-Palatinate is unlikely in the near future. This is regrettable, as Trump's announcements during the election campaign could well have provided impetus for peace policy. Seriously increasing expectations of a reduction in the US military presence could have created political pressure to tackle economic structural reforms and conversion initiatives in order to free ourselves from a supposed economic dependence on the US military presence, at least in the long term.
Let's hold on for now. Two things seem to be emerging so far. Firstly, the election campaign rhetoric and campaign promises so far are being perceived as alienating and irritating in large parts - but not everywhere - in Europe. People here will probably initially distance themselves in a friendly, wait-and-see manner. The European-American friendship will not really be resilient, at least not for some time. Secondly, in the long term, it will be important who Trump includes in his advisors' staff and in his administration. How much of the campaign rhetoric remains in the end will ultimately determine how diplomatic relations develop. A pragmatic working atmosphere will have to be found. It is therefore difficult to predict today how long the horizon for constructive cooperation will be.
Objectively speaking, an "America first" policy is not really new, but must rather be understood as a continuous determinant of US policy. In Trump's descriptions, however, it comes across as unusually harsh and confrontational rhetoric with little consensus. As before, US foreign and security policy will therefore be strongly interest-driven. However, the interest-driven policy and existing reservations about multilateral rules and organizations will be much less hidden in diplomatic calculations and diplomatic rhetoric. A pronounced interest-driven foreign and security policy will thus counteract many multilateral initiatives in dealing with current global political challenges, such as climate change, international development cooperation or geopolitical conflict areas.
Outlook
US administrations, especially Republican ones, have always found it difficult to accept that states - even superpowers - cannot deal with the current complex problems unilaterally, on their own and exclusively for their own benefit. In times of increasing globalization and global interdependence, multilateral rules and institutions remain the most promising programme for dealing constructively with challenges such as climate change, global refugee and migration movements, resource issues, conflicts in geopolitically strategically important regions, etc. Even Trump, it is to be hoped, will not be able to escape this insight in the end. And from then on, we will probably once again recognize many familiar so-called continuities of US foreign and security policy.
About the authors
Dr. Sascha Werthes is . From May 2018 to August 2019, he was also Managing Director of the . From September 2014 to February 2018, he set up and managed the Peace Academy RLP as an academic institution of the University of Koblenz-Landau. Prior to this, he was integrated into the "International Institutions and Peace Processes" department at Goethe University Frankfurt am Main as a lecturer for special tasks (full-time position) under the direction of Professor Dr. Tanja Br眉hl. Between 2003 and 2013, he worked at the at the University of Duisburg-Essen, at the at the University of Duisburg-Essen, at the and at the at the Philipps University of Marburg. As part of the , he was also a guest lecturer at the .
